The education of future generations of citizens is the one common theme that connects otherwise culturally, linguistically, ethnically, and politically diverse communities and countries in an increasingly global society. Social systems foster socially toxic environments, instilling a culture of fear while ignoring the importance of preparing youth for advanced citizenship in a global civil society. The author examines the role of education in relation to global events and explores the purposes of education in meeting the needs of tomorrow's children in (...) an evolving, global society. Specifically, education is examined in relation to creating a safe and socially just society. (shrink)

In this collection, white women philosophers engage boldly in critical acts of exploring ways of naming and disrupting whiteness in terms of how it has defined the conceptual field of philosophy. Focuses on the whiteness of the epistemic and value-laden norms within philosophy itself, the text dares to identify the proverbial elephant in the room known as white supremacy and how that supremacy functions as the measure of reason, knowledge, and philosophical intelligibility.

Importance: Given the importance of apathy for stroke, we felt it was time to scrutinize the psychometric properties of the commonly used Starkstein Apathy Scale for this purpose.Objectives: The objectives were to: estimate the extent to which the SAS items fit a hierarchical continuum of the Rasch Model; and estimate the strength of the relationships between the Rasch analyzed SAS and converging constructs related to stroke outcomes.Methods: Data was from a clinical trial of a community-based intervention targeting participation. A total (...) of 857 SAS questionnaires were completed by 238 people with stroke from up to 5 time points. SAS has 14 items, rated on a 4-point scale with higher values indicating more apathy. Psychometric properties were tested using Rasch partial-credit model, correlation, and regression. Items were rescored so higher scores are interpreted as lower apathy levels.Results: Rasch analysis indicated that the response options were disordered for 8/14 items, pointing to unreliability in the interpretation of the response options; they were consequently reduced from 4 to 3. Only 9/14 items fit the Rasch model and therefore suitable for creating a total score. The new rSAS was deemed unidimensional. Apathy was correlated weakly with anxiety/depression and uncorrelated with physical capacity. Regression showed that the effect of apathy on participation and health perception was similar for rSAS/SAS versions: R2 participation measures ranged from 0.11 to 0.29; R2 for health perception was ∼0.25. When placed on the same scale, rSAS value was 6.5 units lower than SAS value with minimal floor/ceiling effects. Estimated change over time was identical which was not substantial but greater than expected assuming no change.Conclusion: The retained items of the rSAS targeted domains of behaviors more than beliefs and results support the rSAS as a robust measure of apathy in people with chronic stroke. (shrink)

BackgroundThe Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute is obligated to peer review and to post publicly “Final Research Reports” of all funded projects. PCORI peer review emphasizes adherence to PCORI’s Methodology Standards and principles of ethical scientific communication. During the peer review process, reviewers and editors seek to ensure that results are presented objectively and interpreted appropriately, e.g., free of spin.MethodsTwo independent raters assessed PCORI peer review feedback sent to authors. We calculated the proportion of reports in which spin was identified during (...) peer review, and the types of spin identified. We included reports submitted by April 2018 with at least one associated journal article. The same raters then assessed whether authors addressed reviewers’ comments about spin. The raters also assessed whether spin identified during PCORI peer review was present in related journal articles.ResultsWe included 64 PCORI-funded projects. Peer reviewers or editors identified spin in 55/64 submitted research reports. Types of spin included reporting bias, inappropriate interpretation, inappropriate extrapolation of results, and inappropriate attribution of causality. Authors addressed comments about spin related to 47/55 of the reports.Of 110 associated journal articles, PCORI comments about spin were potentially applicable to 44/110 articles, of which 27/44 contained the same spin that was identified in the PCORI research report. The proportion of articles with spin was similar for articles accepted before and after PCORI peer review.DiscussionJust as spin is common in journal articles and press releases, we found that most reports submitted to PCORI included spin. While most spin was mitigated during the funder’s peer review process, we found no evidence that review of PCORI reports influenced spin in journal articles. Funders could explore interventions aimed at reducing spin in published articles of studies they support. (shrink)

Once upon a time, logic was the philosopher’s tool for analyzing scientific reasoning. Nowadays, probability and statistics have largely replaced logic, and their most popular application—Bayesianism—has replaced the qualitative deductive relationship between a hypothesis h and evidence e with a quantitative measure of h’s probability in light of e.

Despite the widespread use of key concepts of the Neyman–Pearson (N–P) statistical paradigm—type I and II errors, significance levels, power, confidence levels—they have been the subject of philosophical controversy and debate for over 60 years. Both current and long-standing problems of N–P tests stem from unclarity and confusion, even among N–P adherents, as to how a test's (pre-data) error probabilities are to be used for (post-data) inductive inference as opposed to inductive behavior. We argue that the relevance of error probabilities (...) is to ensure that only statistical hypotheses that have passed severe or probative tests are inferred from the data. The severity criterion supplies a meta-statistical principle for evaluating proposed statistical inferences, avoiding classic fallacies from tests that are overly sensitive, as well as those not sensitive enough to particular errors and discrepancies. Introduction and overview 1.1 Behavioristic and inferential rationales for Neyman–Pearson (N–P) tests 1.2 Severity rationale: induction as severe testing 1.3 Severity as a meta-statistical concept: three required restrictions on the N–P paradigm Error statistical tests from the severity perspective 2.1 N–P test T(): type I, II error probabilities and power 2.2 Specifying test T() using p-values Neyman's post-data use of power 3.1 Neyman: does failure to reject H warrant confirming H? Severe testing as a basic concept for an adequate post-data inference 4.1 The severity interpretation of acceptance (SIA) for test T() 4.2 The fallacy of acceptance (i.e., an insignificant difference): Ms Rosy 4.3 Severity and power Fallacy of rejection: statistical vs. substantive significance 5.1 Taking a rejection of H0 as evidence for a substantive claim or theory 5.2 A statistically significant difference from H0 may fail to indicate a substantively important magnitude 5.3 Principle for the severity interpretation of a rejection (SIR) 5.4 Comparing significant results with different sample sizes in T(): large n problem 5.5 General testing rules for T(), using the severe testing concept The severe testing concept and confidence intervals 6.1 Dualities between one and two-sided intervals and tests 6.2 Avoiding shortcomings of confidence intervals Beyond the N–P paradigm: pure significance, and misspecification tests Concluding comments: have we shown severity to be a basic concept in a N–P philosophy of induction? (shrink)

While many philosophers of science have accorded special evidential significance to tests whose results are "novel facts", there continues to be disagreement over both the definition of novelty and why it should matter. The view of novelty favored by Giere, Lakatos, Worrall and many others is that of use-novelty: An accordance between evidence e and hypothesis h provides a genuine test of h only if e is not used in h's construction. I argue that what lies behind the intuition that (...) novelty matters is the deeper intuition that severe tests matter. I set out a criterion of severity akin to the notion of a test's power in Neyman-Pearson statistics. I argue that tests which are use-novel may fail to be severe, and tests that are severe may fail to be use-novel. I discuss the 1919 eclipse data as a severe test of Einstein's law of gravity. (shrink)

The growing availability of computer power and statistical software has greatly increased the ease with which practitioners apply statistical methods, but this has not been accompanied by attention to checking the assumptions on which these methods are based. At the same time, disagreements about inferences based on statistical research frequently revolve around whether the assumptions are actually met in the studies available, e.g., in psychology, ecology, biology, risk assessment. Philosophical scrutiny can help disentangle 'practical' problems of model validation, and conversely, (...) a methodology of statistical model validation can shed light on a number of issues of interest to philosophers of science. (shrink)

Suicide has been condemned in our culture in one way or another since Augustine offered theological arguments against it in the sixth century. More recently, theological condemnation has given way to the view that suicidal behavior must always be symptomatic of emotional disturbance and mental illness. However, suicide has not always been viewed so negatively. In other times and cultures, it has been held that circumstances might befall a person in which suicide would be a perfectly rational course of action, (...) in the same sense that any other course of action could be rational: that it could be sensible, i.e., defensible by good reasons, or that it could be in keeping with the agent's fundamental interests. Indiscriminate use of modern life-sustaining technologies has renewed interest in the possibility of rational suicide. Today proponents of rational suicide tend to equate the rationality of suicide with the competence of the decision to commit suicide. (shrink)

In seeking general accounts of evidence, confirmation, or inference, philosophers have looked to logical relationships between evidence and hypotheses. Such logics of evidential relationship, whether hypothetico-deductive, Bayesian, or instantiationist fail to capture or be relevant to scientific practice. They require information that scientists do not generally have (e.g., an exhaustive set of hypotheses), while lacking slots within which to include considerations to which scientists regularly appeal (e.g., error probabilities). Building on my co-symposiasts contributions, I suggest some directions in which a (...) new and more adequate philosophy of evidence can move. (shrink)

A toast is due to one who slays Misguided followers of Bayes, And in their heart strikes fear and terror With probabilities of error! (E.L. Lehmann).

I document some of the main evidence showing that E. S. Pearson rejected the key features of the behavioral-decision philosophy that became associated with the Neyman-Pearson Theory of statistics (NPT). I argue that NPT principles arose not out of behavioral aims, where the concern is solely with behaving correctly sufficiently often in some long run, but out of the epistemological aim of learning about causes of experimental results (e.g., distinguishing genuine from spurious effects). The view Pearson did hold gives a (...) deeper understanding of NPT tests than their typical formulation as accept-reject routines, against which criticisms of NPT are really directed. The Pearsonian view that emerges suggests how NPT tests may avoid these criticisms while still retaining what is central to these methods: the control of error probabilities. (shrink)

Cartwright argues for being a realist about theoretical entities but non-realist about theoretical laws. Her reason is that while the former involves causal explanation, the latter involves theoretical explanation; and inferences to causes, unlike inferences to theories, can avoid the redundancy objection--that one cannot rule out alternatives that explain the phenomena equally well. I sketch Cartwright's argument for inferring the most probable cause, focusing on Perrin's inference to molecular collisions as the cause of Brownian motion. I argue that either the (...) inference she describes fails to be a genuinely causal one, or else it too is open to the redundancy objection. However, I claim there is a way to sustain Cartwright's main insight: that it is possible to avoid the redundancy objection in certain cases of causal inference from experiments (e.g., Perrin). But, contrary to Cartwright, I argue that in those cases one is able to infer causes only by inferring some theoretical laws about how they produce experimental effects. (shrink)

In Philosophical Problems of Statistical Inference, Seidenfeld argues that the Neyman-Pearson (NP) theory of confidence intervals is inadequate for a theory of inductive inference because, for a given situation, the 'best' NP confidence interval, [CIλ], sometimes yields intervals which are trivial (i.e., tautologous). I argue that (1) Seidenfeld's criticism of trivial intervals is based upon illegitimately interpreting confidence levels as measures of final precision; (2) for the situation which Seidenfeld considers, the 'best' NP confidence interval is not [CIλ] as Seidenfeld (...) suggests, but rather a one-sided interval [CI0]; and since [CI0] never yields trivial intervals, NP theory escapes Seidenfeld's criticism entirely; (3) Seidenfeld's criterion of non-triviality is inadequate, for it leads him to judge an alternative confidence interval, [CI alt. ], superior to [CIλ] although [CI alt. ] results in counterintuitive inferences. I conclude that Seidenfeld has not shown that the NP theory of confidence intervals is inadequate for a theory of inductive inference. (shrink)

We argue for a naturalistic account for appraising scientific methods that carries non-trivial normative force. We develop our approach by comparison with Laudan’s (American Philosophical Quarterly 24:19–31, 1987, Philosophy of Science 57:20–33, 1990) “normative naturalism” based on correlating means (various scientific methods) with ends (e.g., reliability). We argue that such a meta-methodology based on means–ends correlations is unreliable and cannot achieve its normative goals. We suggest another approach for meta-methodology based on a conglomeration of tools and strategies (from statistical modeling, (...) experimental design, and related fields) that affords forward looking procedures for learning from error and for controlling error. The resulting “error statistical” appraisal is empirical—methods are appraised by examining their capacities to control error. At the same time, this account is normative, in that the strategies that pass muster are claims about how actually to proceed in given contexts to reach reliable inferences from limited data. (shrink)

The growing acceptance and success of experimental economics has increased the interest of researchers in tackling philosophical and methodological challenges to which their work increasingly gives rise. I sketch some general issues that call for the combined expertise of experimental economists and philosophers of science, of experiment, and of inductive‐statistical inference and modeling. †To contact the author, please write to: 235 Major Williams, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061‐0126; e‐mail: [email protected].

A collection of essays by Oakeshott, Weldon, Macdonald, Rees, Quinton, Mayo, Bambrough, Gaillie, Williams and Laslett. The preface describes this work as representative of the effort to recover the area of politics and society for philosophy. With the exception of essays by Oakeshott, Gaillie and Laslett, the writings are fairly routine applications of the analytic philosophical position to questions related to politics; these applications might just as easily have been made by anyone familiar with the literature of analytic philosophy. (...) Gaillie, in the most stimulating piece of the group, attempts to show that contemporary society is possessed of a double moral personality in which eighteenth century liberalism and modern socialism are found coexistent in the same individual.--J. E. B. (shrink)

Mayo Clinic is recognized as a worldwide leader in innovative, high-quality health care. However, the Catholic mission and ideals from which this organization was formed are not widely recognized or known. From partnership with the Sisters of St. Francis in 1883, through restructuring of the Sponsorship Agreement in 1986 and current advancements, this Catholic mission remains vital today at Saint Marys Hospital. This manuscript explores the evolution and growth of sponsorship at Mayo Clinic, defined as “a collaboration between (...) the Sisters of St. Francis and Mayo Clinic to preserve and promote key values that the founding Franciscan sisters and Mayo physicians embrace as basic to their mission, and to assure the Catholic identity of Saint Marys Hospital.” Historical context will be used to frame the evolution and preservation of Catholic identity at Saint Marys Hospital; and the shift from a “sponsorship-by-governance” to a “sponsorship-by-influence” model will be highlighted. Lastly, using the externally-developed Catholic Identity Matrix (developed by Ascension Health and the University of St. Thomas, Minnesota), specific examples of Catholic identity will be explored in this joint venture of Catholic health care institution and a secular, nonprofit corporation (Mayo Clinic). (shrink)

Morality and business ethics are topics facing increased attention in modern management, yet they tend to be looked at only in relation to external relationships. However one of the most important contributions to management practice and theory (human relations) was built upon a sociological theory that was totally concerned with morality. That sociological theory was borrowed by Mayo (the father of human relations) without reading the original theory; consequently he missed the real point that the theory made, i.e. a (...) common morality embracing everyone was necessary to maintain order and social cohesion. Such a morality was only possible when we realised our social dimension through continuous contact with each other. Moral man had to be social man; occupational groups were a way of attempting to achieve this. Yet morality is a dimension of group dynamics and management training rarely mentioned, partly through ignorance, partly through a fear of what discussions of morality might lead on to, and partly through a structural blindness to non-operational problems. (shrink)

El derecho a la identidad se ha constituido a lo largo del tiempo en el paradigma ético, político y jurídico que sustenta el reclamo de Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo por la restitución de quienes fueron apropiados/as durante la vigencia del Terrorismo de Estado en Argentina. En la actualidad, este derecho está consagrado con jerarquía constitucional en nuestro orden jurídico y existen organismos públicos, como la Comisión Nacional por el Derecho a la Identidad (CONADI), que velan por garantizarlo y (...) reparar su violación en el pasado. Sin embargo, este derecho no siempre existió como tal. Su formulación actual es producto de una historia compleja en la que se entrecruzaron el activismo político de Abuelas, la intervención de profesionales e intelectuales que colaboraron con su causa y diferentes actores de las redes trasnacionales de derechos humanos y de defensa de los derechos de la niñez. A partir del relevamiento y análisis de testimonios orales y fuentes escritas de diversa procedencia, en este artículo indagaremos los orígenes históricos del derecho a la identidad y los actores involucrados en su “invención”. Examinaremos también su impacto en la lucha de Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo y su trascendencia más allá de esta causa puntual. Este análisis nos permitirá observar cómo la “invención” de este derecho se produjo en el diálogo entre saberes globales y el activismo local de Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo y entre la especificidad históricamente situada de su causa y la expectativa universalista y transhistórica de los Derechos Humanos. (shrink)

Although theoretical results for several algorithms in many application domains were presented during the last decades, not all algorithms can be analyzed fully theoretically. Experimentation is necessary. The analysis of algorithms should follow the same principles and standards of other empirical sciences. This article focuses on stochastic search algorithms, such as evolutionary algorithms or particle swarm optimization. Stochastic search algorithms tackle hard real-world optimization problems, e.g., problems from chemical engineering, airfoil optimization, or bioinformatics, where classical methods from mathematical optimization fail. (...) Nowadays statistical tools that are able to cope with problems like small sample sizes, non-normal distributions, noisy results, etc. are developed for the analysis of algorithms. Although there are adequate tools to discuss the statistical significance of experimental data, statistical significance is not scientifically meaningful per se. It is necessary to bridge the gap between the statistical significance of an experimental result and its scientific meaning. We will propose some ideas on how to accomplish this task based on Mayo's learning model. (shrink)

Although theoretical results for several algorithms in many application domains were presented during the last decades, not all algorithms can be analyzed fully theoretically. Experimentation is necessary. The analysis of algorithms should follow the same principles and standards of other empirical sciences. This article focuses on stochastic search algorithms, such as evolutionary algorithms or particle swarm optimization. Stochastic search algorithms tackle hard real-world optimization problems, e.g., problems from chemical engineering, airfoil optimization, or bio-informatics, where classical methods from mathematical optimization fail. (...) Nowadays statistical tools that are able to cope with problems like small sample sizes, non-normal distributions, noisy results, etc. are developed for the analysis of algorithms. Although there are adequate tools to discuss the statistical significance of experimental data, statistical significance is not scientifically meaningful per se. It is necessary to bridge the gap between the statistical significance of an experimental result and its scientific meaning. We will propose some ideas on how to accomplish this task based on Mayo’s learning model (NPT*). (shrink)

The issues of double-counting, use-constructing, and selection effects have long been the subject of debate in the philosophical as well as statistical literature. I have argued that it is the severity, stringency, or probativeness of the test—or lack of it—that should determine if a double-use of data is admissible. Hitchcock and Sober ([2004]) question whether this ‘severity criterion' can perform its intended job. I argue that their criticisms stem from a flawed interpretation of the severity criterion. Taking their criticism as (...) a springboard, I elucidate some of the central examples that have long been controversial, and clarify how the severity criterion is properly applied to them.1. Severity and Use-Constructing: Four Points (and Some Clarificatory Notes) 1.1. Point 1: Getting beyond ‘all or nothing’ standpoints1.2. Point 2: The rationale for prohibiting double-counting is the requirement that tests be severe1.3. Point 3: Evaluate severity of a test T by its associated construction rule R1.4. Point 4: The ease of passing vs. ease of erroneous passing: Statistical vs. ‘Definitional’ probability2. The False Dilemma: Hitchcock and Sober 2.1. Marsha measures her desk reliably2.2. A false dilemma3. Canonical Errors of Inference 3.1. How construction rules may alter the error-probing performance of tests3.2. Rules for accounting for anomalies3.3. Hunting for statistically significant differences4. Concluding Remarks. (shrink)

En un polémico y curioso diálogo que Carl Schmitt escribió para un programa radiofónico en 1954, y que fue emitido primeramente bajo el título “Principios del poder”, [1] el influyente pensador político alemán sostiene, en uno de sus pasajes centrales, que Hobbes es el más moderno de los filósofos políticos. En su argumentación señala que Hobbes fue capaz de exponer el poder en términos exclusivamente humanos, esto es, desde la perspectiva de su infinita peligrosidad. Según Schmitt, el estado moderno plenamente (...) organizado en la teoría hobbesiana es un producto técnico artificial, una gran máquina moderna creada por hombres a través del consenso pero, una vez constituida, capaz de superar todo consenso situándose sobre el hombre e independiente del hombre mismo. Desde hace ya algunas décadas venimos asistiendo a un renacer del interés por Hobbes que se ha hecho manifiesto en una multiplicación de sugerentes relecturas y reinterpretaciones de su pensamiento que llenan los índices de las editoriales en el área de la filosofía y la ciencia política. La lectura de Schmitt podríamos considerarla particularmente señera de esta tendencia actual, al advertirnos sobre la cercanía que las teorías del pensador inglés guardan con la desnuda realidad con que hoy en día los dispositivos de poder operan en nuestra sociedad post capitalista. Dentro de esta atmósfera de actualidad de Hobbes en la que se comienza a respirar, quizás de forma algo inconsciente, una serie de tesis supuestamente sabidas sobre las teorías del pensador inglés, eso que se suele denominar lugares comunes, es de agradecer la iniciativa que han tenido los editores Guillermo Escolar y Alejandro Mayo de acercarnos, en una edición bilingüe extremadamente cuidada, esta obra de Thomas Hobbes conocida como “Tratado sobre la libertad y la necesidad” y que su autor escribió, sin la intención de publicar, hacia 1645. Reencontrarnos con la prosa fina, inteligente y polémica del pensador inglés, en uno de sus momentos más lúcidos y en medio de la ardua y encendida controversia que mantuvo con el obispo de Derry, John Bramhall, nos permite reconocer la verdadera modernidad de las tesis de Hobbes, al tiempo que nos devuelve a la claridad sobre el alcance e incidencia que su pensamiento ha tenido en las reflexiones posteriores sobre la naturaleza del poder y de la libertad y sobre las ilusiones que tantas veces hemos edificado sobre estos conceptos. (shrink)

Introducción a la problemática jurídica actual, por R. M. Alsina.--La filosofía de la cultura, por Francisco Romero.--El sentido del derecho para la vida humana, por Juan Llambías de Azevedo.--El derecho como objeto y la ciencia del derecho, por E. R. Aftalión.--Las especies del saber jurídico (consideraciones de epistemología) por Manuel Río.--Posición cultural de las orientaciones políticas, por M. T. Ruiz Moreno.

On the fundamental of Hindu philosophy with commentary in verse form.

There are two reasons, I claim, scientists do and should ignore standard philosophical theories of objective evidence: Such theories propose concepts that are far too weak to give scientists what they want from evidence, viz., a good reason to believe a hypothesis; and They provide concepts that make the evidential relationship a priori, whereas typically establishing an evidential claim requires empirical investigation.

Revisión de Tesis Memorias, género y militancias: agencia y politicidad en las trayectorias de las mujeres integrantes de Madres de Plaza de Mayo-La Plata por M. E. Nieto.

In order for online communities to assemble and grow, some basic infrastructure is necessary that makes possible the aggregation of the collective action. There is a very intimate and complex relationship between the technological infrastructure and the social character of the community which uses it. Today, most infrastructure is provided by corporations and the contrast between community and corporate dynamics is becoming increasingly pronounced. But rather than address the issues, the corporations are actively obfuscating it. Wikiwashing refers to a strategy (...) of corporate infrastructure providers where practices associated to their role of profit seeking corporations that would be seen as unethical by the communities they enable are concealed by promoting a misleading image of themselves associated with the general values of wikis and Wikipedia . The empirical analysis is based on case studies and triangulation of several methods. (shrink)

Keller & Miller's (K&M's) conclusion appears to be correct; namely, that common, harmful, heritable mental disorders are largely maintained at present frequencies by mutation-selection balance at many different loci. However, their “paradox” is questionable. (Published Online November 9 2006).

I will argue in what follows, following the insights of James Marshall on busno‐cratic power, that resistance to this new power is already well underway, and that this resistance is potentially problematic and potentially transgressive (in Marshall's words ‘a reflective reconstitution’). The self is not only a chooser in busno‐cratic land, it is also re‐commodifying itself and in so doing, beginning to struggle at the limits of its commodified situation. I will argue that commodified selves, as much as they are (...) constrained, are also potent sites for resistance. Part of that resistance is being waged in the terrain of the high stakes test, where the self that could ‘choose’ runs headlong into a product that definitively limits its range of choice. In order to engage critically with this resistance, I examine the cracks in the monolithic power of testing, cracks that point to the uncertainty of numbers and the ambivalent anxieties of test takers. (shrink)

Discussions of science and values in risk management have largely focused on how values enter into arguments about risks, that is, issues of acceptable risk. Instead this volume concentrates on how values enter into collecting, interpreting, communicating, and evaluating the evidence of risks, that is, issues of the acceptability of evidence of risk. By focusing on acceptable evidence, this volume avoids two barriers to progress. One barrier assumes that evidence of risk is largely a matter of objective scientific data and (...) therefore uncontroversial. The other assumes that evidence of risk, being "just" a matter of values, is not amenable to reasoned critique. Denying both extremes, this volume argues for a more constructive conclusion: understanding the interrelations of scientific and value issues enables a critical scrutiny of risk assessments and better public deliberation about social choices. The contributors, distinguished philosophers, policy analysts, and natural and social scientists, analyze environmental and medical controversies, and assumptions underlying views about risk assessment and the scientific and statistical models used in risk management. (shrink)

: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has recommended that HIV testing be routinely offered to certain patients in hospitals with a high prevalence of HIV infection and on all pregnant women. The CDC does not, however, offer implementation level guidelines for obtaining informed consent. We provide a moral justification for requiring informed consent for HIV testing and propose guidelines for securing such consent. In particular we argue that genuine informed consent can be secured without elaborate counseling, such (...) as that currently used at Counseling and Testing Sites, provided that sufficient written notice is given to the patients before testing and that they are specifically asked for permission. (shrink)

This text provides a critique of the subjective Bayesian view of statistical inference, and proposes the author's own error-statistical approach as an alternative framework for the epistemology of experiment. It seeks to address the needs of researchers who work with statistical analysis.